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BOOK REVIEWS
MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS. By Harold Marsh,
Jr. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 1952. Pp. xi, 263. $4.50.
The notion that an entire system of choice of law rules might be
deduced from a few over-all principles has been abandoned ever since
Beale's numerous critics demonstrated that the structure which he had
tried to erect on such foundations was uninhabitable. The same method
must be applied in conflicts law as in all other branches of the law. We
must carefully and painstakingly investigate what issues are at stake in
particular problems, and then apply to their solution those policies which
have found expression in our society and, consequently, in its law as the
guiding directives for the adjustment of conflicting interests. Mr. Justice
Jackson notwithstanding,' these policies are more numerous and more
varied than the one of establishing a division of law-making powers
among the states of the Union along such clear and firm lines that there
would never be any doubt or overlapping. The most important of these
policies have recently been stated by Professors Cheatham and Reese;2
how they are to be applied in the solution of definite type problems of
conflicts law has been demonstrated in Professor Rabel's great work.3
The reconstruction of American conflicts law along these lines re-
quires patient investigation and thought. The need has already stimulated
a number of monographic investigations of limited topics4 and to this
valuable body of literature Mr. Marsh's book constitutes a welcome
addition.
Mr. Marsh approaches his topic in a refreshingly sober manner,
which pleasantly contrasts to the theorizing of the now defunct older
school. The author tries to put to work the realistic method of Falcon-
bridge,5 Neuner,0 Wolff7 and, above all, Rabel, and he consistently uses
1. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause in the Constitution, 45
COL. L. REv. 1 (1945).
2. Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Cor L. RE. 959 (1952).
3. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1950).
4. CARNAHAN, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1942);
HANCOCK, TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1942) ; LAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1940); LORENZEN, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS RELATING TO BILLS AND NoTES
(1919); ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAwS (1940).
5. FALCONBRIDGE, ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT Or LAWS (1947).
6. Neuner, Policy Consideration in the Conflict of Laws, 20 CAN. BAR. REv.
479 (1942) ; Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws, 5 LA. L. REV. 167 (1943).
7. WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw (1945).
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that semantic caution in the use of language, the importance of which
was so forcefully demonstrated by the late Walter Wheeler Cook.8 The
present state of the conflicts field is characterized by the fact that Mr.
Marsh has found it necessary to precede his inquiry into the concrete topic
of his book with an extensive discussion of the method of thought
in conflicts law in general. The entire second chapter, constituting almost
one-fourth of the book, is devoted to this discussion of the basic aspects
of the choice-of-law problem. It is carried on under the three headings of
characterization, policy considerations in the selection of the law appli-
cable, and conflict of choice-of-law rules, i.e., renvoi. In all three respects
the author adopts those refined techniques which have been elaborated
through the last twenty years or so, such as Rabel's clarifying approach
to those problems which have come to be referred to as characterization,
Neuner's differentiating search for policies, and Falconbridge's concili-
atory ideas about the use of the renvoi technique. Throughout, Mr.
Marsh refuses to follow the give-it-up method which was once advocated
by Professor Cavers, 9 but which we have reason to believe is no longer
seriously contemplated by that scholar.
The main part of the book is contained in chapters 3-5. Each one
of the three great groups of problems just mentioned is discussed with
relation to those choice-of-law problems which arise in connection with
questions of marital property laws. All the chapters on conflicts law are
preceded by a detailed and extensive analysis of the marital property
laws in the United States.
The author's arrangement of the book has unquestionably helped
him to achieve those clarifications by which his work is distinguished,
but it has also produced a certain repetitiousness. In presenting his gen-
eral methodology the author naturally resorts to illustrations from the
field of marital property law and a great deal of what is said in the three
sections of the chapter on method reappears again in the three chapters
on concrete application. Both the strengths and the weaknesses of Mr.
Marsh's approach are demonstrated by that first chapter in which he
surveys the substantive law of all the states of this country. Among the
most valuable contributions is his detailed analysis of the practical mean-
ing of those terms of art which are in current use in marital property
law. Cutting through such lump sum terms as community property,
separate estate, or community debt, Mr. Marsh investigates with in-
finite patience the law of every one of the forty-eight states. The inquiry
includes what concrete interests or expectations the husband has in, or
8. CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942).
9. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933).
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with respect to, the assets of the wife, and vice versa; in what respects one
spouse has a power to affect through his acts property interests of the
other and in what respects such assets are immune against being affected
by the other spouse's acts; what either spouse's interests are in cases of di-
vorce or death; and in what ways the various kinds of assets are avail-
able for the satisfaction of the creditors of either spouse. From this
investigation, which must have required an 'immense amount of work,
it becomes clear that the general labels of separate or community prop-
erty, etc., have very different meanings in the laws of the different states.
This, indeed, is one of the most valuable results of Mr. Marsh's investi-
gation: To have demonstrated the futility and danger of the indiscrimi-
nate use of these general labels.
It should for all the future render impossible such decisions as that
reached in La Selle v. Woolery.10 In this celebrated case it was held that
debts which had been incurred by the husband while he and his wife were
residents of a separation of assets state could not be enforced against
community assets acquired after the parties had moved to Washington.
Had the parties remained in Wisconsin, the debts would have been en-
forceable against the husband's assets; had the debts been incurred in
Washington, they would have been what is there called community debts
and could have been enforced against the community assets. But, having
been created before there was a community fund, the court argued, they
cannot be community debts; hence they must be separate debts of the
husband, and under Washington law separate debts cannot be enforced
against community assets. Removal to Washington and, it should be
added, Arizona, 1 thus has results similar to bankruptcy. Perhaps, the
court of Washington wished to advertise: "Go West, debtor, go West !"
If so, it has skillfully disguised the policy behind a verbal fallacy which
has been laid bare by Mr. Marsh's analysis. The court, as he proves, has
looked to words rather than to those concrete rules of law to which, in a
short-hand way, these words refer. This painstaking investigation into
the concrete details of the laws of all American states, as they actually
work, and the demonstration of the ambiguity of these verbal expressions
is of the highest value, not only for purposes of conflicts law but also for
anyone interested in marital property law. Here we have, indeed, a fine
illustration of applied functional comparative law.
However, the accumulation of all this meticulously stated detail is
also confusing. Sometimes it is difficult to realize that all those trees
go to form a forest. The details of the laws of every one of the forty-
10. 14 Wash. 70, 44 Pac. 115 (1896).
11. Cf. Cosper v. Valley Bank, 28 Ariz. 373, 237 Pac. 175 (1925).
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eight states are held together by some over-all ideas and policies, in the
community property states by the idea that marriage is a kind of partner-
ship-like joint venture, in the separation of assets states by the notion
that, as far as property is concerned, marriage does not create a com-
munity, and that the parties stand to each other in the relationship of
strangers. In both systems these over-all ideas are implemented differ-
ently in detail or modified in various respects, for example, in relation to
the wife's power to dispose of her own earnings, or in the situations aris-
ing upon death or in the case of divorce. An attempt to group the mass of
detail in some such way and to show how they are held together in each
state by some, more or less clearly conceived and more or less con-
sistently implemented, over-all policy would not only have helped the
reader to find his way through the welter of state law phenomena, but
it might also have been useful in the solution of the problems of conflicts
law which arise from the numerous differences between them.
These conflicts problems are, as we have seen, grouped by the author
under the three main headings of characterization, selection of law appli-
cable, and renvoi. Perhaps, these problems are more intimately connected
with each other than may appear from this tri-partite arrangement. As to
the bulk or core of those problems which one is accustomed to discuss un-
der the heading of marital property law, almost universal agreement exists
today, at least in this country, that they should be decided under the law
of the state in which the parties resided at the time of the acquisition of
the paricular asset in question or, as the author is intent to point out
consistently, of that asset into which the asset now in question can be
traced back. Questions arise, however, with respect to the scope of this
rule or, in other words, as to the meaning of the term "marital property
law." Again, Mr. Marsh in his quest for semantic clarity regards this
over-all term of little use and thus sets out to catalogue those concrete
type problems which have arisen in connection with property rights as
influenced by marriage and the diversity of state laws dealing with these
problems.- With great care he investigates for each of these problems
what interests and conflicting policies they involve, and in what way or
ways such conflicts may be solved with the least amount of friction. Most
of the results reached in thig way are convincing, practicable and sensible,
but again, the reader cannot sometimes help feeling lost in all the detail.
Perhaps greater perspicacity might have resulted from an attempt to
define that core of problems to which the basic rule, stated above, should
properly apply, and then to determine its boundaries against other groups
of problems for which other rules of choice of law are more appropriate.
Such an attempt might have been facilitated by the clear statement of the
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proposition that the basic cdnflicts rule as to marital property interests
is concerned with the determination of the law which is to fix interests
in property assets not as isolated items but as constituent parts of a fund.
The question of determining in what ways, if any, the property interests
existing in a single thing, movable, immovable, or intangible, are affected
by a legal transaction between A and B is generally determined by the
law of the place where that thing is situated at the time of that trans-
action. As different things may be situated in different places, the effect
of the transaction may have to be determined for each of them under a
different law. Each asset is looked upon singly and what effects, if any,
the transaction is to have with respect to the property interests existing
in it, is to be determined for each under the law of its situs. But what
are the effects brought about with respect to interests in assets by the
conclusion of the peculiar transaction "marriage" or by the fact that the
status of matrimony has been created by a marriage and now exists be-
tween two parties? In this respect we, as well as other countries, have
found it expedient to look not to every asset as a single, isolated item but
as a part of a total fund (or a group of funds) so that the influence of
the marriage upon the property interests in those assets is determined
simultaneously for all of them. We, in the United States, look for this
purpose to the law of the parties' residence at the time of original acqui-
sition. All assets belonging to, or acquired by, one of them during the
parties' period of residence in state X are affected in the same way by X
law, irrespective of where they happen to be situated. In European doc-
trine this difference between the modus operandi of the rules of lez rei
sitae and le" domicilii is usually referred to as that between statutum
totale and statutum singulare. This distinction is, of course, not made for
its own sake but for sensible reasons of policy.
As far as the relations between a husband and his wife are concerned,
it would be impractical to treat each property asset as a single item with
the possibility of different interests existing for each under different situs
laws. The treatment as a general fund might be dangerous, however, for
prospective third purchasers, mortgagees, and creditors, who must have
an easy and reliable way of determining the property interests in assets
which they contemplate to purchase or to treat as a security for credit to
be extended. Determination under the law of'the situs constitutes the
easiest way to satisfy this need. How then are the two needs to be
reconciled, those of the spouses for uniform treatment, and that of out-
siders for separate treatment? Here is an over-all approach which might
simplify and unify the treatment of many concrete problems. Of course,
these considerations do appear in the author's treatment of the concrete
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problems, but the reader's understanding might be helped by some effort
to place them 'in broader perspectives. Just as the scope of the conflicts
rule subjecting problems of marital property interests in general to the
law of the parties' residence at the time of the original acquisition must
be demarcated from the scope of 'the rule which refers problems of
changes in property interests in sihgle assets to the law of the situs, so
the scope of the former rule must be delimited against that which refers
problems of the law of succession to property upon death to the law of
the decedent's domicile as of the time of his death. Here, we are 'also
dealing with a rule which relates to certain assets not as single items
but as parts of a fund, viz., the decedent's estate.
The demarcation of this statutum successionis from that of the scope
of the conflicts rule on marital property law has been particularly trouble-
some. It was, indeed, in this connection that the celebrated problem of
characterization made its first appearance. Assume H and W have ever
since their marriage resided in Illinois, and during their long residence
there the husband has accumulated considerable Wealth, let us say
$600,000, all of which he has invested in securities and other movables.
The parties move to Louisiana and just a few days thereafter H dies
intestate. Had the parties remained residents of Illinois, W would now be
entitled to an intestate share of one-third of the estate if H is survived by
issue or, if not, to his entire estate. Had the parties been residents of
Louisiana all the time, the fortune accumulated by H would have been
community property, and W would be entitled to one-half as her share.
But under the circumstances it seems that W is to receive nothing. The
fund owned by H before he moved to Louisiana cannot be community
property; hence, it must be separate estate, and under Louisiana law the
surviving spouse is, at least regularly, not entitled to any share in the
separate estate of the predeceasing spouse. That rule makes good sense
within the framework of Louisiana law which gives the surviving spouse
his or her one-half share in' the community. But it turns out, or seems
to turn out, to produce nonsense in the peculiar situation of coincidence
of the two laws of Illinois and Louisiana. Clearly the widow must get
at least as much as she would be given by the less' generous of the two
laws. This also seems to be Mr. Marsh's answer,12 but, I have to confess,
I do not quite see how it is reached by him. Yet, the way, which has been
shown by Neuner,13 is plain: We must refine the choice of law rules.
The traditional formulation of both rules, that relating to problems
of marital property law and that relating to the law of succession are too
12. Pp. 226 et seq.
13. See note 6 supra.
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crude and must be limited and supplemented by a new rule, or new rules,
by which specific reference is made to the case of a change of residence
from a separation of assets state to a community property state, and vice
versa. In the same way the choice of law rules must be rephrased from
their present overgeneralizing and oversimplifying formulae, and must
be broken down to a very much larger number of narrower rules of more
specific application, until they are similar to the rules in all other fields
of law, of which nobody dreams that they would be encompassed in just
one or two dozen general maxims. If we do this consistently the law of
conflict of laws will come to be like all other law; it will lose its mystify-
ing aspects and, quite particularly, there will disappear those two bogeys
by which it has been haunted too long, characterization and renvoi. But
that is a story which cannot be told in a book review.
How refinement of the choice of law rules can be achieved in a field
of great practical importance, has been instructively demonstrated by
Mr. Marsh. He has not gone the whole length of the way, but he has
carried us far. His book constitutes an important contribution to that
reconstruction of conflicts law in which we are presently engaged in this
country as well as abroad. Conflicts between American and foreign sub-
stantive laws as well as foreign conflicts law have been considered by
Mr. Marsh only insofar as they have been treated by Rabel, Wolff and
other authors writing in English. It is to be hoped that Mr. Marsh's
book will attract the attention not only of the American practitioners
and scholars but also of the foreign workers in the vineyard.
Max Rheinsteint
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEmPORARY BRITAIN. By Wolf-
gang G. Friedmann. London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd. Pp. xxiv, 322.
37s. 6d.
Most jobs of law-men, whether practitioners or writers, require
close range work. This engenders the threat of professional myopia as
a serious occupational hazard. It brings, therefore, wholesome relief to
find and read the work of a legal scholar who has the courage, if not
audacity, to step back a few paces, take a good look and then paint a
picture of what he saw. Of course, a canvas of this type is illuminating
only if its creator is endowed with vision and, above all, knows how to
handle his colors. Professor Friedmann exhibits all these qualities requi-
t Max Pam Professor of Comparative Law, University of Chicago Law Sciool
